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_____________ 
 
No. 10-4092 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
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NEAL D. SAFERSTEIN, 
        Appellant 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
         (D.C. Crim. No. 2:07-00557) 
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 24, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges, and 
JONES
*
, District Judge. 
                                              
*
 The Honorable John E. Jones, III, United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by 
designation.   
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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Neal Saferstein (“Saferstein”) pled guilty in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
to four federal criminal charges related to a 
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fraudulent business scheme in which he had engaged.  In the 
plea agreement, Saferstein waived his appellate rights subject 
to several exceptions, including an exception for “the 
assertion of constitutional claims that the relevant case law 
holds cannot be waived.”  (App. 90.)  Following his sentence, 
Saferstein now argues on appeal that the District Court (1) 
violated his due process rights by denying him credit he 
believes he was due under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) for acceptance of 
responsibility;  (2) denied him his right of allocution at 
sentencing; and (3) violated his rights under the ex post facto 
clause.  He contends that his appellate waiver does not 
foreclose any of these arguments.     
 We hold, as a result of a statement by the District 
Court during the plea colloquy, which improvidently 
expanded Saferstein‟s appellate rights, that Saferstein did not 
waive his right to raise constitutional claims on appeal.  We 
further find that his ex post facto claim is of constitutional 
moment and meritorious.  We will vacate and remand to the 
District Court for resentencing. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
From 1997 until 2004, Saferstein was President, Chief 
Executive Officer, and majority owner of GoInternet, a 
telemarketing company based in Philadelphia.  Beginning in 
1997, GoInternet‟s telemarketers cold-called businesses 
around the country in an attempt to sell them an internet 
services package, including a web page, dial-up web access, 
and an email account.  GoInternet began charging each 
business that agreed to receive a “welcome packet” $29.95 
per month for these services, a fee which was added to its 
telephone bill.  By the end of 2003, more than 350,000 
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businesses were “customers” of GoInternet, yielding annual 
gross revenue in excess of $49 million.    
GoInternet‟s implementation of this business model 
had several fraudulent aspects.  First, the telemarketers 
frequently failed to disclose the full terms of the agreement, 
including the fact that consenting to receive a welcome packet 
would result in the $29.95 monthly charge unless the business 
called GoInternet within fifteen days to cancel services.  
Second, the welcome packet looked like unsolicited junk 
mail, so that it was often discarded unopened.  Even if a 
customer did open and read the welcome packet, disclosures 
related to billing were hidden, so that most customers 
remained unaware that they were required to cancel services 
in order to avoid being charged.  Third, because the charges 
appeared only within telephone bills, many customers did not 
notice the GoInternet charges.  Fourth, GoInternet lacked the 
personnel to handle incoming calls from customers, making it 
extremely difficult for customers who attempted to cancel to 
do so successfully.   
In addition to these fraudulent practices, the web pages 
provided to GoInternet customers were not accurate or useful 
to potential customers.  The websites were generic, filled with 
mistakes, and often appeared at web addresses that were 
impossible to locate using major search engines.   
The Government has estimated the losses to customers 
associated with the scheme to be approximately $74 million.   
 In 2000, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
brought suit against Saferstein and GoInternet.  Federal 
Trade Commission v. Mercury Marketing of Delaware, Inc., 
and Neal D. Saferstein, No. 00-CV-3281 (E.D. Pa. filed June 
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29, 2000).  On March 1, 2001, the parties agreed to a 
stipulated judgment and order for permanent injunction, 
which contained various prohibitions to protect customers 
from unauthorized billing and directed GoInternet to send 
postcards to all of its customers informing them that they 
were being billed and were paying for GoInternet services.  
Despite the agreement, Saferstein directed that those 
postcards be altered or destroyed.   
As a result of this and other noncompliant conduct, the 
FTC sought to hold Saferstein and GoInternet in contempt.  In 
anticipation of a hearing on that matter before the District 
Court, Saferstein directed GoInternet executive, and eventual 
co-defendant, Billy D. Light to testify falsely that 55,000 
GoInternet customers used their email accounts and 33,000 
used their dial-up internet service each week.  Throughout his 
time as CEO of GoInternet, Saferstein earned approximately 
$20,000 each month in commissions, in addition to an annual 
base salary.  He also paid for significant personal expenses 
with corporate funds.  His tax returns, however, reported only 
his annual base salary.   
The criminal indictment in this case charged Saferstein 
with failing to report more than $1.8 million in income.  
Saferstein additionally failed to pay more than $2.8 million in 
payroll taxes that had been withheld from GoInternet 
employees‟ paychecks.   
The indictment charged Saferstein with (1) sixteen 
counts of mail and wire fraud; (2) one count of conspiracy to 
commit perjury; (3) four counts of submitting false tax 
returns; and (4) six counts of failure to pay over payroll taxes.  
Just before trial, Saferstein pled guilty to Count 1, mail fraud; 
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Count 16, wire fraud; and Counts 20 and 21, submitting false 
tax returns. 
The plea agreement contained language stipulating 
that, “as of the date of this agreement, the defendant has 
demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for his offense” 
and is therefore “eligible for a 2-level downward adjustment” 
pursuant to the Guidelines.  (App. 86.)  It also contained an 
appellate waiver provision, which provided that Saferstein 
“voluntarily and expressly waive[d] all rights to appeal or 
collaterally attack” his conviction, subject to several 
exceptions.  (Id. at 90.)  The waiver was “not intended to bar 
the assertion of constitutional claims that the relevant case 
law holds cannot be waived.”  (Id.)  Further, it provided an 
exception if the government were to appeal Saferstein‟s 
sentence and excepted a small number of enumerated claims 
that Saferstein would be permitted to raise on appeal: (1) that 
his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for that count; 
(2) that the sentencing judge erroneously departed upward 
under the Guidelines; or (3) that the sentencing judge 
imposed an unreasonable sentence above the Guideline range.   
During the plea colloquy, the District Court discussed 
the waiver in detail with Saferstein.  It explained the appellate 
rights that Saferstein would have absent the waiver and 
precisely what rights remained.  Regarding the provision 
concerning constitutional claims, the court stated that the 
waiver “of course, is not intended to bar you [from] raising 
constitutional claims, and only the Court can decide whether 
they are constitutional claims or some other kind of claim.”  
(Id. at 161.)  When asked whether he understood, Saferstein 
responded in the affirmative.   
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After the sentencing hearing, the District Court 
ultimately agreed with the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”) that Saferstein qualified for a criminal history 
category of I and an offense level of 43, largely as a result of 
the enormous amount of money that the fraud involved.  
Based on this Guidelines calculation, Saferstein was eligible 
for the statutory maximum sentence, forty-six years on the 
four counts. 
The District Court denied Saferstein credit for 
acceptance of responsibility.  It based this determination on 
several factors.  First, the Court noted that after pleading 
guilty, Saferstein had failed to expeditiously turn over certain 
financial and medical reports to the probation office.  Second, 
it determined that a number of his statements during the 
sentencing hearing “backtrack[ed] on the enormity of his own 
involvement in the scheme that he is responsible for 
contriving.” (Id. at 298.)   
The court, after granting a significant downward 
variance, sentenced Saferstein to twenty-three years of 
imprisonment, composed of concurrent twenty-year sentences 
on each of the wire and mail fraud counts, followed by 
concurrent three-year sentences on the two counts charging 
submitting false tax returns.  He also received three years of 
supervised release and a fine of $100,000.  Saferstein timely 
appealed.        
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction 
over a challenge to the sentence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
3742(a).  “[O]ur review of the validity and scope of appellate 
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waivers is plenary.”  United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 
926 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).   
We review for plain error Saferstein‟s claim that he 
was sentenced in violation of the ex post facto clause, which 
he did not raise in the District Court.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); 
United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 158 (3d Cir. 2002).  “A 
defendant must satisfy a four-prong test to be successful 
under plain error review:  there must be (1) an error; (2) that 
is plain; (3) which affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously 
impairs the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  United States v. Cesare, 581 F.3d 206, 209 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Appellate Waiver 
 When “the government invokes an appellate-waiver 
provision contained in a defendant‟s plea agreement, we must 
determine as a threshold matter whether the appellate waiver 
prevents us from exercising our jurisdiction to review the 
merits of the defendant‟s appeal.”  Corso, 549 F.3d at 926 
(citations omitted).  We decline to exercise jurisdiction over 
the appeal where the issues on appeal fall within the scope of 
the waiver and the defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
agreed to the waiver, unless “enforcing the waiver would 
work a miscarriage of justice.”  Id. at 927 (citations omitted).   
 Here, Saferstein argues that he did not waive his right 
to this appeal because each of the issues he presents represent 
constitutional claims and the District Court, during the plea 
colloquy, stated that the appellate waiver “of course, is not 
intended to bar you [from] raising constitutional claims, and 
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only the Court can decide whether they are constitutional 
claims or some other kind of claim.”  (App. 161.)  As a result, 
Saferstein argues that the agreement he entered into 
voluntarily and knowingly preserves his right to appeal 
constitutional claims.   
The Government contends that this statement is not 
controlling, since it misrepresents the plain language of the 
plea agreement, which states that the waiver was “not 
intended to bar the assertion of constitutional claims that the 
relevant case law holds cannot be waived.”  (Id. at 90.)  The 
District Court‟s statement is clearly at odds with the 
otherwise plain and straightforward language of the 
agreement.  That statement thus created a plausible and 
tangible ambiguity and seemingly expanded Saferstein‟s 
appellate rights.
 1
 
  We have not spoken before on the impact of a 
sentencing court‟s oral statement during a plea colloquy on 
the interpretation of a plea agreement.  It is clear that 
                                              
1
 “[L]ogic indicates that if we may rely on the sentencing 
court‟s statements to eliminate ambiguity prior to accepting a 
waiver of appellate rights, we must also be prepared to 
recognize the power of such statements to achieve the 
opposite effect.  If it is reasonable to rely upon the court‟s 
words for clarification, then we cannot expect a defendant to 
distinguish and disregard those statements of the court that 
deviate from the language of a particular provision in a 
lengthy plea agreement.”  United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 
1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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principles of contract law apply to plea agreements.  United 
States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Generally speaking, because the government exercises 
tremendous bargaining power during the process of plea 
negotiation, we construe any ambiguities in the text against 
the government as drafter, id. at 422, but the plain text at 
issue here is not ambiguous.  It clearly refers to a specific 
subset of constitutional claims,
2
 not to the entire category of 
constitutional claims, as the District Court‟s statement during 
the colloquy indicated.   
The parol evidence rule generally mandates that when 
a “written contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must 
be determined by its contents alone.”  Amer. Eagle Outfitters 
v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 594 (3d Cir. 2009).  
However, the plea colloquy has no analogue in contract law; 
indeed, regardless of the clarity of a written plea agreement, 
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
obligates a district court, before accepting a plea of guilty, to 
place the defendant under oath and to address the defendant 
orally and in open court, informing him of, inter alia, “the 
terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to 
appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.”  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 11(b)(1)(N).  The court must also determine that the 
defendant understands those terms.  Id.   
                                              
2
 Although the parties engage in substantial debate as to 
whether the category of non-waiveable constitutional claims 
is an empty category, this is not a question we need to resolve 
here.  The language of the agreement is not ambiguous 
regardless of the answer. 
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We have recognized that a plea colloquy that fails to 
meet the requirements of Rule 11(b)(1)(N) can prevent a 
defendant from knowingly and voluntarily waiving his 
appellate rights.  Corso, 549 F.3d at 928-930; see also United 
States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 540-41 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Given that precedent, and our recognition that plea 
agreements must be construed to protect the defendant as the 
weaker bargaining party, see Williams, 510 F.3d at 422, we 
must find that a statement made by the sentencing court 
during the colloquy can create ambiguity where none exists in 
the plain text of the plea agreement.  See United States v. 
Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e cannot 
expect a defendant to distinguish and disregard those 
statements of the court that deviate from the language of a 
particular provision in a lengthy plea agreement-especially 
where, as here, neither the government nor defense counsel 
apparently noticed the error at the time.”).  We construe this 
ambiguity against the government and interpret the waiver 
narrowly.  Therefore, we shall allow Saferstein to raise 
constitutional claims on appeal, as the District Court 
represented during the colloquy that he would be able to do.
 3
  
                                              
3
 Saferstein‟s argument that the District Court erred by 
denying him credit for acceptance of responsibility is not 
constitutional in nature.  The only support Saferstein musters 
for his contention that this error implicates his due process 
rights, United States v. Furst, 918 F.2d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 
1990), and its progeny, in fact notes constitutional dimensions 
to sentencing based on materially false information.  
Saferstein‟s allegation that the sentencing court erroneously 
interpreted the Guidelines is distinct and does not implicate 
his due process rights.   
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B. Ex Post Facto Claim 
The only issue Saferstein raises which is of 
constitutional moment is his ex post facto claim.  Saferstein 
argues that his sentencing, which occurred in accordance with 
the 2009 Guidelines Manual, violated the ex post facto clause.  
See art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  The mail and wire fraud counts of which 
he was convicted occurred in December 2002 and June 2003, 
and the base offense level for fraud under the Guidelines was 
                                                                                                     
 Saferstein also argues that the District Court infringed upon 
his right of allocution by allowing the Government to cross-
examine him before sentencing.  “[T]he right of allocution is 
not constitutional.”  United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 
288 (3d Cir. 2001).  Although Saferstein asserts that our later 
opinion in United States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 
2007), undermines the clear pronouncement in Adams, Adams 
still controls.  Our precedent makes clear that “to the extent 
that [an opinion of a panel of this Circuit] is read to be 
inconsistent with earlier case law, the earlier case law . . . 
controls.”  Holland v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 246 F.3d 267, 278 
n.8 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 
F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981)).  
Accordingly, neither of these claims falls under the 
constitutional exception to Saferstein‟s appellate waiver, and 
we shall not consider them on the merits.   
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subsequently increased on November 1, 2003.  U.S.S.G. 
appx. C, amend. 653.  Both counts for submitting false tax 
returns of which Saferstein was convicted occurred after that 
date.   
The Guidelines direct a one-book rule, requiring that a 
“Guidelines Manual in effect on a particular date shall be 
applied in its entirety.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(2).  When a 
“defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first committed 
before, and the second after, a revised edition of the 
Guidelines Manual became effective, the revised edition of 
the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses.”  § 
1B1.11(b)(3).  According to the background note in the 
Guidelines, “Because the defendant completed the second 
offense after the amendment to the guidelines took effect, the 
ex post facto clause does not prevent determining the 
sentence for that count based on the amended guidelines.”  Id.  
The background note also provides that this approach “should 
be followed regardless of whether the offenses of conviction 
are the type in which the conduct is grouped under § 
3D1.2(d),” unless the ex post facto clause would be violated 
by that treatment.  Id.     
Nonetheless, commentary to the Guidelines does not 
bind federal courts where it violates the Constitution, United 
States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1405 (3d Cir. 1994), and we 
have held that the ex post facto clause requires that a 
sentencing court apply the Guidelines Manual in effect at the 
time the offense was committed if retroactive application of 
the later Manual would result in harsher penalties.  United 
States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1424 (3d Cir. 1992), 
superseded by statute for other reasons as stated in United 
States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 624 (3d Cir. 1995).  Further, 
we have expressly disapproved the one-book rule where it 
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conflicts with the ex post facto clause by resulting in “more 
stringent penalties than were authorized at the time of the 
offense.”  Id.   
Even “[t]he fact that various counts of an indictment 
are grouped cannot override ex post facto concerns,” Bertoli, 
40 F.3d at 1404 (citing Seligsohn, 981 F.2d at 1424), although 
our ex post facto concerns are assuaged when counts are 
properly grouped under § 3D1.2(d) as “continuing, related 
conduct” and the sentencing court applies the Guidelines 
Manual relevant to the latest count.  United States v. Siddons, 
660 F.3d 699, 707 (3d Cir. 2011).  In such a case, “the 
grouping provisions, combined with the one-book rule, place 
a defendant on notice that a court will sentence him or her 
under the Guidelines Manual in effect during the commission 
of his or her last offense in a series of continuous, related 
offenses.”  Id. 
Here, the sentencing court applied the Guidelines 
Manual in effect when the false tax returns were submitted to 
the IRS even though those counts were not grouped with the 
mail and wire fraud counts.  Indeed, the PSR recognized that, 
pursuant to our decision in United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 
1052 (3d Cir. 1991), tax fraud counts could not be grouped 
with fraud on private individuals.  In this circumstance, the 
application of the later edition of the Guidelines Manual did 
violate the ex post facto clause.   
Since the sentencing court made an error that is plain, 
Saferstein meets the first two prongs of the plain error test.  
See Cesare, 581 F.3d at 209.  We have also held that when 
the application of the wrong Guidelines Manual, in violation 
of the ex post facto clause, results in the use of a higher 
sentencing range, there is a presumption that the defendant‟s 
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substantial rights are affected.  See Syme, 276 F.3d at 158.  
The government has failed to rebut this presumption of 
prejudice.  Finally, we have concluded in the past that such an 
error “too „seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings‟ to be left uncorrected.”  Id. 
(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)).      
 Accordingly, we vacate Saferstein‟s sentence and 
remand to the District Court with instructions to calculate his 
base offense level in accordance with the Guidelines Manual 
in effect when the mail and wire fraud counts were 
committed. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
sentence imposed by the District Court and remand for 
resentencing in accordance with the above opinion.  
